This research examines the impact of the ownership structure on corporate diversification decision of listed firms in Vietnam over the period of 2007 and 2012. The empirical results from logit model show that while state ownership has positive impact on corporate diversification decisions of the firms, foreign ownership has negative impact on corporate diversification decision of the firms. This implies that government ownership tends to encourage corporate diversification strategy, while foreign ownership may plays monitoring role and discourage corporate diversification strategy in emerging market context.
INTRODUCTION
As an emerging market, Vietnam plays a considerable role in world economy. GDP growth rate of Vietnam is higher compared to the average growth rate of emerging and developing markets. (International Monetary Fund 2010). Before 1986, Vietnam was a centrally planned economy that is characterized by state ownership. However, the 1986 economic reform (known as Doi Moi) led to privatization of state owned enterprises. The privatization process has led to a gradual change in ownership structure of Vietnamese firms. There was appearance of private ownership and foreign ownership. Foreign ownership has become an considerable part of ownership structure in Vietnamese firms (Phung & Le 2013) . It is observed that state ownership and foreign ownership contribute to more than a half of GDP of Vietnam (Vietnam General Statistics Office 2006 Office , 2010 Office , 2014 . Thus, state ownership and foreign ownership are important in ownership structure of firms in Vietnam.
Corporate diversification is an expansion strategy adopted by many enterprises around the globe (Lin & Su 2008) . With the encouragement of Vietnamese government since the 1990s, many Vietnamese firms, especially state-owned firms, have tended to diversify. Research on topic of corporate diversification is still unexplored in Vietnam. Identifying determinants of corporate diversification is crucial when examining effect of corporate diversification on firm performance. Agency problem is a main reason for corporate diversification (Martin & Sayrak 2003) , and ownership structure is a major factor affecting a firm's propensity to diversify. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine effect of ownership structure (state ownership and foreign ownership) on corporate diversification decision in the context of Vietnam.
Using data of Vietnamese listed firms over the period of 2007 and 2012, this paper finds that state ownership has positive effect on corporate diversification decision and foreign ownership has negative effect on corporate diversification decision. This implies a political and social goals of state ownership, and monitoring role of foreign ownership in firms. The results contribute to the literature of ownership structure in the context of emerging market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses literature review of relationship between ownership and corporate diversification. Section 3 develops hypotheses. Section 4 discusses research methodology. Section 5 discusses summary statistics and correlation matrix. Section 6 discusses empirical results and finally, section 7 concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
When there is existence surplus resources in current businesses, a firm is likely to diversify its operations. Corporate diversification is often considered as a strategy for firms in order to expand their operation and reach the goal of profit maximization. An explanation for corporate diversification is changes in economic or industry environments (Campa & Kedia 2002) . Firms may escape from their current businesses when these businesses are not profitable. Firms may benefit from there multi businesses since they can survive longer even if a specific business fails (Bercovitz & Mitchell 2007) .
From the perspective of agency theory, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) reveal two arguments which may be used to explain firms' propensity to diversify. They are risk reduction and private benefit of firms' managers. When senior managers own shares in firms, they may bear idiosyncratic risk when the firms do not diversify. The higher managerial ownership is; the higher idiosyncratic risk managers face and thus they try to conduct corporate diversification strategy for lowering the risk. As gaining more benefits such as reputation or compensation, managers may make investments in many new area. This give managers incentive to diversify firm's business. Amihud and Lev (1999) inspect the effect of ownership structure on the corporate diversification strategy and find that the relation between corporate diversification and ownership concentration is negative. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1999) show evidence that there is a negative link between corporate diversification level and managerial ownership. They state that, as the managers own more shares, they do not tend to follow the diversification strategy. Chen, S-S and Ho (2000) find that the level of diversification has negative relation to outside block holder ownership, but it is unrelated to insider ownership. They find that diversified firms which have lower value than single segment firms, often associate with low managerial ownership.
Chen, C-J and Yu (2012) state that most studies investigate the relationship between corporate diversification and ownership structure within the context of developed economies while there are few studies focusing on emerging markets. Their study examines the relationship between managerial ownership, corporate diversification, and firm performance in the context of Taiwan. They show that the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate diversification is not a linear relationship but a U-shaped relationship. This implies that higher managerial ownership leads to a decrease in diversification at a level, but after this point, higher managerial ownership leads to an increase in diversification.
Del Brio, Maia-Ramires and De Miguel (2011) argue that concentrated ownership is helpful in a weak investor protection market because large shareholders can monitor the managers. Ownership concentration can be considered as an alternative means for protecting investors in the context of poor investor protection civil law countries. They find a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and corporate diversification for Spanish firms. Their results state that the concentration of ownership plays a monitoring role towards the manager's actions. However, when the concentration is too high, exceeding a breakpoint, controlling owners tend to follow diversification strategy that can expropriate the benefits of minority shareholders.
Ownership identity is also an element impacting the firm's diversification strategy. Government owners normally have dissimilar purposes compared to those of private owners because government owners have goals that regularly accompany political interests (Shleifer & Vishny 1994 
HYPOTHESES
Research findings reveal that ownership structure affects diversification ( However, most studies focus on the ownership of large shareholders and managers, while there are few studies that examine state ownership and foreign ownership. Delios, Zhou and Xu (2008) shows that the identity of ownership structure may determine the decision of firms to diversify. Ownership identity can affect the ability and level of diversification of firms.
Differences in ownership structure may affect diversification decision of firms. For example, family owned firms try to diversify to spread risk and generation transition (Nachum 1999) , while the propensity of state owned firms is driven by the social and political goals rather than the value maximization objectives (Wan et al. 2011 Foreign ownership increasingly occupies a significant position in the ownership structure of listed firms in Vietnam. Foreign investment helps to provide investment capital, transform economic and labour structure, and promote technology 4 . There are few studies that examine the effect of foreign ownership on the level of corporate diversification. Ramaswamy and Li (2001) show that there is a negative relationship between number of foreign directors and unrelated diversification for Indian firms. This is due to the fact that foreign directors have knowledge and experience that can monitor and dampen corporate diversification strategy. Yoshikawa, Rasheed and Del Brio (2010) state that corporate diversification is not motivated by foreign shareowners because it is difficult to manage diversified firms. They argue that foreign ownership is considered as a means to monitor Japanese firms, and that foreign ownership restrain the firms' managers from engaging in corporate diversification strategies by decreasing managers' bonuses.
3
The privatization program was initiated in 1992 (Sjöholm 2006 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Empirical model specification
In order to test the hypotheses of the propensity of corporate diversification in Vietnamese listed firms (H.1 and H.2), this thesis employs the following empirical model:
where DIVit is a binary variable representing whether firm i is undergoing a corporate diversification strategy at time t, OWNit is firm's ownership structure (state or foreign), Xits are control variables of firm i at time t, and εit is an error term.
Since the dependent variable is binary, a logit model is used for the estimation. The logit model allows for estimating the probability that firms diversify or not by predicting the outcome of the binary dependent variable from independent variables. The general logit model is as follows:
where yi is a binary dependent variable, xi is an independent variable,  is a constant term, and pi is the probability of undertaking corporate diversification (odds ratio).
In order to estimate the parameters in equation (4), maximum likelihood estimation is used (Czepiel 2002; Lin & Su 2008) . The likelihood function and log likelihood function are expressed as follows:
In order to find the parameters from the log likelihood function, we differentiate the log likelihood with respect to each parameter and set the outcome to zero.
Percent correct prediction statistic is a measure of goodness of fit for logit model. This measure shows how well the model predicts the probability (Wooldridge 2011 ). The percent correct prediction statistic assumes that if the estimated pi (odds ratio) is greater than or equal to 0.5 then the event is expected to occur, it is not expected to occur otherwise.
DATA AND VARIABLES
Data
The data used to examine the effect of ownership on firm's decision to diversify and the effect of corporate diversification on firm performance is by In accordance with Campa and Kedia (2002) and Dastidar (2009) , this study uses various control variables to investigate the impact of ownership on the likelihood of taking corporate diversification i.e. firm characteristics such as firm size, firm leverage, book to market ratio, firm age, profitability; and industry and economy characteristics such as fraction of diversified firms in industry and GDP growth rate.
Variables
Firm size is a factor that impacts on corporate diversification. It can be argued that when its size increases, a firm tends to diversify its business because it has more resources for expanding. Singh Profitability is a firm characteristic that affects corporate diversification decision. It is argued that firms with low profitability tend to expand their businesses through corporate diversification in order to find profitable opportunities (Campa & Kedia 2002) . Profitability influences the way that firms with high profitability tend to be less diversified (Campa & Kedia 2002) . It is also found that multi-segments firms are likely to have poor profitability (Claessens et al. 1999) . In this study, profitability is measured by the ratio of earnings before tax and interest to sales (Campa & 
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX
natural log of assets. PROF is firm profitability, i.e. the ratio of operating income and sales. LEV is firm leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt over total assets. AGE is firm age, the natural log of number of years since a firm registered as a corporation. BM is the book to market ratio. NDIV is the fraction of diversified firms in an industry. GDP is GDP growth rate.
The mean value of corporate diversification variable is 0.331 which indicates 33.1 percent of observed firms diversify. State ownership has a mean value of 25.1 percent which is lower than the state ownership value of 34.59 percent in China (Lin & Su 2008) . Foreign ownership has a mean value of 7.6 percent which is considerably smaller than that of 20.97 percent in India (Ramaswamy & Li 2001) . The average value of firm size (natural log of assets) is 26.715 and its standard deviation is 1.291. Profitability of listed firms in Vietnam has an average value of 9.7 percent, with a standard deviation of 0.096. The mean value of profitability is slightly higher than that of 6 percent in the U.S. Table 2 illustrates the correlation matrix of variables. Level of corporate diversification is positively correlated with state ownership (STATE), and negatively correlated with foreign ownership (FOREIGN). Level of corporate diversification is positively correlated with a firm's size, leverage, investment, age, book to market ratio and the fraction of diversified firms in industry, and negatively correlated with profitability, dividend yield and GDP growth rate. Table 3 reports the results of the logit models for the effect of ownership structure on corporate diversification decisions as per equation (1) . Columns (1) and (3) report the logit models of corporate diversification decision, regressed on ownership structure (state and foreign ownership) and firm-specific characteristics. Columns (2) and (4) report the logit models of corporate diversification decision, regressed on ownership structure, firmspecific characteristics, and industry and economic characteristics. The table illustrates the average marginal effect of ownership structure and other independent variables on corporate diversification propensity of listed firms in Vietnam. The marginal effect is computed as the discrete change in the expected value of the corporate diversification dummy variable as it changes from 0 to 1.
the natural log of assets. PROF is firm profitability, i.e. the ratio of operating income and sales. LEV is firm leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt over total assets. AGE is firm age, the natural log of the number of year since a firm registered as a corporation. BM is the book to market ratio. NDIV is the fraction of diversified firms in industry. GDP is GDP growth rate.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In the columns (1) and (2) of the Table 3 , the marginal effect estimates of state ownership are positive and significant. The result therefore supports the hypothesis one (H1) which indicates that firms with high state ownership are likely to diversify their businesses. This result may imply that representatives for the state in firms allow the firms pursue corporate diversification strategy in order to guarantee their jobs or self-benefits.
The foreign ownership variable indicates a negative and significant result. This means that the hypothesis two (H2) is confirmed. Foreign ownership in Vietnamese listed firms discourages corporate diversification decisions of firms. This may imply that foreign investors try to protect themselves from expropriation conducted by manager or insiders. (2) and (4)). This result implies that firms with low growth opportunities tend to expand through diversification (Singh, Mathur & Gleason 2004) . Profitability variable shows a negative sign and is insignificant (except in model (1)). This result is consistent with Campa and Kedia (2002) which shows that profitability does not strongly affect a firm's corporate diversification decision. Industry characteristic variable (fraction of number of diversified firms in industry) is positive and significant. This implies that industry characteristic affects likelihood of taking corporate diversification strategy and indicates that firms which operate in industry which is dominated by diversified firms are likely to engage corporate diversification strategy (Campa & Kedia 2002 Lang & Stulz 1994) , this study may practically contribute to policy makers and investors. The result may help policy makers in proposing policies which encourage or discourage corporate diversification strategy of firms in accordance with diferrent ownership structure. The research also implies that investors, especially individual investors, should be aware of ownership structure when investing in diversified firms.
This research, however, has some limitations. While the study only examine effect of foreign ownership on corporate diversification decision, future research should further investigate effect of foreign institutional ownership and/or effect of foreign individual ownership on corporate diversification decision of firms. Because corporate diversification decision may be dynamic, future research may use a dynamic model specification such as system GMM to explore the impact of ownership structure on firm's corporate diversification.
